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SHOULD THE SEC SPIN OFF THE ENFORCEMENT 
DIVISION?
PETER J. HENNING*
“It's only when the tide goes out that you learn who's been swimming naked.”  Warren Buffett. 
The federal government’s blueprint for financial reform in the wake of the 
market meltdown of 2008 involves strengthening the oversight powers of the 
Securities & Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”).  Among President 
Obama’s proposals is greater regulation of credit-default swaps, a multi-trillion dollar 
market that remains completely unregulated by any administrative body.  In addition 
to new rules for the market, the financial reform plan will seek to “[e]mpower[ ] 
market regulators to take vigorous enforcement action against fraud, market 
manipulation, and other market abuses.”1
The government may be misguided in its decision to rely on the SEC as the 
primary civil law enforcement agency for the financial markets, however.  Over the 
past few years, the SEC’s record for policing fraud in the securities markets has not 
been stellar.  The SEC’s mishaps range from failing to uncover a Ponzi scheme2 to a 
completely mismanaged insider trading investigation.3  There is even the possibility 
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School © 2009.  The author may be contacted at 
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1 U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Strengthening Regulation of Core Markets and Market Infrastructure, June 17, 
2009, available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/strengthening_reg_core-
markets_infrastructure.pdf. 
2 Former investment adviser Bernard Madoff received a 150-year prison sentence after confessing to 
an enormous Ponzi scheme.  The government estimated that Madoff’s scheme lasted decades and 
cost investors billions of dollars, yet the SEC still missed the warning signs regarding Madoff’s 
conduct.  See Testimony of Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director, Division of Enforcement, United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission, Investigations and Examinations by the Sec. and Exch. Comm’n and Issues Raised by 
the Bernard. L. Madoff Investment Securities Matter Before the United States Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 5-6 (2009).  The Commission’s Inspector General issued a highly critical 
review of the SEC’s various failed investigations of Madoff’s investment advisory operation in which 
his Ponzi scheme flourished.  See SEC, Office of Investigations, Investigation of Failure of the SEC to 
Uncover Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi Scheme – Public Version, Aug. 31, 2009, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf. 
3 An investigation of possible insider trading at Pequot Capital Management was suddenly shut down 
and the lead investigator fired shortly thereafter.  See Report of SEC Investigation, 153 CONG. REC.
S10889-90 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2007).  At one point, the head of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement 
showed particular deference to counsel for a witness with powerful Wall Street connections by 
providing reassurances about his role, even though he had not testified in the matter.  Id.
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that SEC staff engaged in insider trading.4  Yet, under President Obama’s proposals, 
the SEC “appears a winner in the opening phase of financial services regulatory 
reorganization.”5  Rewarding the agency that seemingly failed in its core enforcement 
function with additional regulatory powers is like asking General Motors to operate 
the entire American automobile industry.  One wonders why the SEC’s failures have 
resulted in a reward rather than a reconsideration of how the laws are enforced. 
Despite its problems, the SEC could still get its “mojo” back as Wall Street’s 
top cop.  However, it is worth asking whether the enforcement function should be 
shifted away from the SEC and moved to an agency that can coordinate civil and 
criminal investigations without fear of outside influences.  The problems the SEC 
experienced over the past few years in fulfilling its obligation to police the financial 
markets are traceable at least in part to pressure from Congress, the White House, 
and Wall Street to cut back on vigorous enforcement of the securities laws, especially 
the antifraud provisions.  Furthermore, the agency has to police the very people it 
seeks out for advice and counsel in crafting its rules.  Taking a hard look at whether 
the Commission can continue to serve as Wall Street’s “top cop” is thus in order. 
The current environment that is so supportive of increased regulation and 
enforcement will, at some point, pass from the scene as the pendulum swings back 
toward a less intrusive approach to oversight.  Whether the Commission can resist 
renewed entreaties to go easier on enforcing the law in order to free the capital 
markets from strict regulation is an open question.  To allow the SEC to regulate 
Wall Street, splitting off at least a portion of the enforcement function to an agency 
with expertise in prosecution, specifically the United States Department of Justice, is 
worthy of consideration. 
Any decent financial planner would advise you to at least consider selling an 
investment when the market values it highly, especially when there is a possibility 
that the value will decline in the future.  I worked in both the SEC Enforcement 
Division and the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, so I am not 
pushing a particular institutional bias in favor of one over the other.  My point is that 
this may be the time for the Commission to spin off the Enforcement Division to 
the Department of Justice to limit the possibility that enforcement of the major 
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws will be hampered the way it has 
been in the recent past. 
4 See United States SEC, Office of Inspector General, 2009 Semiannual Report to Congress, at 40-42, 
available at http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/Semiannual/2009/semiapr09.pdf. 
5 Stephen J. Crimmins, Securities Regulation Under the Obama Plan, 41 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1209, 
1209 (June 29, 2009).  The author notes that “[j]ust months after some were placing much of the 
blame for the financial crisis on the SEC’s shoulders and questioning whether it was up to the task of 
fixing things, the Treasury Proposal now praises the SEC as ‘an experienced federal supervisor’ . . ..”  
Id.
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I. THE SEC’S ENFORCEMENT FOCUS
The SEC states that its mission is “to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, 
and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”6  Among its primary 
functions is the oversight of the capital markets by, inter alia, regulating brokers, 
investment advisors, mutual funds, and market operators to ensure that capital is 
available and that securities are traded efficiently.  The SEC adopts a wide range of 
rules, from net capital requirements for broker-dealers to disclosure regulations for 
publicly-traded companies, and its ongoing responsibilities include oversight of the 
operating procedures for the major stock exchanges.7  Under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, the SEC is responsible not only for overseas bribery cases involving 
public companies, but also for ensuring that companies whose shares are traded on 
stock exchanges maintain adequate accounting systems and internal controls.8  On 
top of all this responsibility, the Commission is seeking to expand its supervisory role 
by pursuing congressional authority to be put in charge of the securities-related over-
the-counter derivatives market, which has an estimated market value of 
approximately $6.8 trillion.9
All the standard regulatory work of inspecting broker-dealers and reviewing 
corporate and mutual fund filings comes before the SEC staff as part of its 
responsibility for oversight of the complex federal securities laws, such as the 
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Trust Indenture Act 
of 1939, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and the Investment Company Act of 
1940.10  In addition to a number of technical provisions in these statutes, the 
Commission is also responsible for policing the markets under broad antifraud 
provisions, including § 78j(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, which prohibits use of 
“any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” in connection with the 
6 See SEC, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and 
Facilitates Capital Formation (Sept. 22, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/ 
whatwedo.shtml. 
7 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (2009) (“Each self-regulatory organization shall file with the Commission, in 
accordance with such rules as the Commission may prescribe, copies of any proposed rule or any 
proposed change in, addition to, or deletion from the rules of such self-regulatory organization 
(hereinafter in this subsection collectively referred to as a “proposed rule change”) accompanied by a 
concise general statement of the basis and purpose of such proposed rule change.”). 
8 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-3 (2009). 
9 See Testimony Concerning Regulation of Over-The-Counter Derivatives by Chairman Mary L. Schapiro, Before the 
Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
111th Cong. (2009). 
10 See 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2009); 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa (2009); 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2009); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 
(2009); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (2009). 
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purchase or sale of any security.11  At the end of the 2008 fiscal year, the SEC had 
over 4,000 open investigations of securities law violations – more than one for each 
employee at the agency.12
In addition to its civil regulatory role, SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar has 
even proposed that the authority to pursue criminal prosecutions for securities law 
violations be transferred to the Commission, because “[p]roviding the SEC with this 
authority would be an effective way to enhance the federal law enforcement of all 
securities law violations by expanding the amount of cases that may be brought.”13
By law, the Attorney General has the exclusive responsibility for criminal 
prosecutions by the federal government, an authority that is rather jealously 
guarded.14  It would be quite a change if one particular subject matter were carved 
out of the Department of Justice and moved to the agency responsible for drafting 
the regulations and overseeing the laws to be enforced.  Such a shift in authority 
could even engender an impermissible conflict of interest.15
11 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2009). 
12 See Select SEC and Market Data, Fiscal 2008, Table 4, available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2008.pdf; SEC, The Investor’s Advocate supra note 6 (“The 
Commission’s approximately 3,500 staff are located in Washington D.C. and in 11 Regional Offices 
throughout the country.”). 
13 Luis A. Aguilar, SEC Comm’r, Empowering the Markets [sic] Watchdog to Effect Real Results, 
Speech before the North American Securities Administrators Association's Winter Enforcement 
Conference (Jan. 10, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch011009laa.htm.  
Commissioner Aguilar further suggested that: 
[T]he SEC could use greater ability to bring cases against people who lie during the 
course of an investigation.  Accordingly, Congress should grant the Commission 
the power to bring civil and administrative proceedings for violations of 18 U.S.C. 
1001 and to seek civil money penalties.  18 USC 1001 is the criminal statute that is 
violated when someone lies to a government official. 
Id.
14 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2009) (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which 
the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing evidence 
therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney 
General”).  See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 190 (5th Cir. 1965) (Wisdom, J., concurring) (“The 
prosecution of offenses against the United States is an executive function within the exclusive 
prerogative of the Attorney General.”). 
15 In Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 805 (1987), the Supreme Court 
rejected the appointment of a party’s attorney to pursue a criminal contempt prosecution based on the 
violation of a court order.  The Court stated that: 
The Government's interest is in dispassionate assessment of the propriety of 
criminal charges for affronts to the Judiciary.  The private party's interest is in 
obtaining the benefits of the court's order.  While these concerns sometimes may 
be congruent, sometimes they may not.  A prosecutor may be tempted to bring a 
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In response to the recent perceived breakdowns in the enforcement process, 
Robert Khuzami was appointed as the new Director of the Enforcement Division.16
Mr. Khuzami’s credentials were touted in an SEC press release:  “Throughout his 
career, Rob has demonstrated an unwavering commitment to prosecuting 
wrongdoers and protecting citizens.  As a former federal prosecutor, Rob is well-
suited to lead the SEC’s Division of Enforcement as we continue to crack down on 
those who would betray the trust of investors.”17  Mr. Khuzami’s outstanding record 
as a prosecutor includes working on a significant terrorism case, as well as securities 
fraud prosecutions.18  After leaving government service, he worked as general 
counsel for the Americas at Deutsche Bank, a multinational financial institution.19
What he is missing, however, is direct experience with the civil side of the SEC, 
including more arcane areas such as disclosure cases and delinquent filings.  A good 
litigator can practice in a wide variety of areas, but the mindset of a prosecutor or in-
house counsel is quite different from that of the civil regulator who must take into 
account the burdens of regulation and the need to allow some flexibility in the 
enforcement of voluminous regulations. 
A recent initiative by Mr. Khuzami, with the Commission’s support, gave the 
Enforcement Division the authority to issue formal orders of investigation without 
prior approval.  Such orders would allow the staff to issue subpoenas for records and 
to require individuals to appear for testimony.20  In SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., the 
tenuously supported prosecution if such a course promises financial or legal 
rewards for the private client.  Conversely, a prosecutor may be tempted to 
abandon a meritorious prosecution if a settlement providing benefits to the private 
client is conditioned on a recommendation against criminal charges. 
Id.
While not exactly the same, a similar issue could arise if the SEC were to have the authority to pursue 
both a civil and criminal action for an alleged violation of the federal securities laws.  In such a case, 
might the Enforcement Division use the threat of criminal charges as a bludgeon to obtain a civil 
settlement, or to pursue a defendant who had won a victory in a case? 
16 Press Release, SEC, Robert Khuzami Named SEC Director of Enforcement (Feb. 19, 2009), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-31.htm. 
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 See 17 C.F.R. § 200.30-4(a)(1) (2009); Robert Khuzami, Director, SEC, Remarks Before the New 
York City Bar: My First 100 Days as Director of Enforcement (Aug. 5, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/ speech/2009/spch080509rk.htm.  In this speech, Mr. Khuzami explained 
the rationale for the change as prompted by a need for speed, and perhaps even a move to send a 
message to defense counsel not to mess with the SEC.  He stated: 
We are also streamlining our internal process to make us more nimble and quick.  I 
am announcing tonight that the Commission has approved, subject to certain 
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Supreme Court noted that “[t]he purposes of such an order seem to be to define the 
scope of the ensuing investigation and to establish limits within which the staff may 
resort to compulsory process.”21  The former process required the Enforcement 
Division staff to get approval from the full Commission before it could issue 
subpoenas, a slow and bureaucratic process.  Now, management in the Enforcement 
Division can authorize the formal order without further review, creating a much 
more streamlined process that is akin to the way the Department of Justice conducts 
grand jury investigations, which do not require any prior approval before subpoenas 
are sent to obtain records and testimony.22  The criminal investigatory model appears 
to be the dominant approach these days. 
The apparent push to turn the Enforcement Division into a quasi-
prosecutorial office23 is interesting because the premium focus seems to be on 
pursuing enforcement cases that involve dishonest practices broadly affecting the 
exceptions, an order that delegates to the Division Director the authority to issue 
formal orders of investigation, with their accompanying subpoena power.  I in turn 
intend to delegate that authority to senior officers throughout the Division.  Thus, 
staff will no longer have to obtain advance Commission approval in most cases to 
issue subpoenas; instead, they will simply need approval from their senior 
supervisor.  This means that if defense counsel resist the voluntary production of 
documents or witnesses, or fail to be complete and timely in responses or engage in 
dilatory tactics, there will very likely to be a subpoena on your desk the next 
morning. 
Id.
21 SEC. v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 738 n.1 (1984). 
22 See SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW & PRACTICE § 6:2 (2d ed. 1993) (“In a majority of 
states and in the federal system the prosecutor plays a more significant role in using the subpoena 
power to marshal evidence for presentation to the grand jury.  Although the statutes in these states do 
not explicitly address the question of whether the prosecutor must seek the grand jury’s authorization 
before exercising subpoena power, the general thrust of the provisions seems to be to give the 
prosecutor independent authority to issue subpoenas.”). 
23 On July 2, 2009, the SEC issued a press release touting the hiring of Lorin L. Reisner as Deputy 
Director of the Enforcement Division.  Press Release, SEC, Lorin L. Reisner to Join SEC 
Enforcement Division (July 2, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-
150.htm.  Mr. Reisner will serve directly under Mr. Khuzami.  Id.  This press release described part of 
Reisner’s background as serving “as an Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of 
New York from 1990-94, where he investigated and prosecuted financial crimes, public corruption, 
organized crime, narcotics and firearms offenses.”  Id. A month earlier, the SEC had appointed 
George S. Canellos Regional Director of its New York Regional Office, the most important office 
outside of the headquarters in Washington, D.C.  Press Release, SEC, George S. Canellos Named 
Regional Director of SEC New York Regional Office (June 2, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
press/2009/2009-125.htm.  Mr. Canellos was also a colleague of Mr. Khuzami in the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office in Manhattan, where he was a Senior Trial Counsel on the Securities and Commodities Fraud 
Task Force.  Id.  Serving in this previous position means he has substantial experience in the securities 
field, albeit on the criminal side, much like the primary focus of Mr. Reisner and Mr. Khuzami.  Id.
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markets, and not as much on the more mundane, although important, aspects of 
securities law enforcement.  The majority of the SEC’s enforcement cases are 
administrative proceedings, not federal court filings.24  Thus, while insider trading 
and Ponzi scheme cases may garner the greatest media attention, it is the day-to-day 
administration of the federal securities laws that ensures the capital markets are 
operating properly.  While the prosecutorial model may appease members of 
Congress and the public who want heads on platters after the Madoff debacle, that is 
not necessarily the SEC’s role as the primary regulator of the capital markets. 
Criminal prosecution is usually reserved only for the most serious cases, and 
is not a tool to be used unreflectively or in response to public outcries.  Unlike a civil 
enforcement action, a criminal prosecution triggers a wide range of constitutional 
rights, most prominently the due process requirement that the charge be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  If there is a conviction, then the court is empowered to 
inflict significant punishment on the defendant, including a term of imprisonment.  
An SEC civil enforcement action is usually not designed to punish a person, but 
instead is a remedial proceeding to protect the public and seek disgorgement of ill-
gotten gains to return to those who suffered losses.  Criminal and civil proceedings 
are not interchangeable, and involve significantly different considerations.  There is a 
good reason why they are handled separately, even if there is significant overlap in 
the underlying facts and legal theories. 
II. THE SEC AND THE NATURE OF CIVIL ENFORCEMENT
Making the SEC more like the Department of Justice by turning the 
Enforcement Division into a new type of United States Attorney’s Office may not be 
the best way to advance the SEC’s role as the overseer of the capital markets.  The 
enforcement function may be among the SEC’s better known operations, but it is 
certainly not its only purpose.  The SEC’s regulatory role in adopting rules for the 
markets and companies has far greater impact on the markets, because it shapes the 
way Wall Street operates on a day-to-day basis. 
When it engages in rulemaking, it is important for the SEC to listen to its 
constituencies, which include not only small investors, but also investment banks, 
brokerage firms, mutual funds, stock exchanges, and even the oft-reviled hedge 
funds and private equity firms.  Lobbying the SEC is not necessarily improper 
because the Commission has to balance the needs of different constituencies, not all 
of whom have the same goals.  The SEC routinely turns to leaders on Wall Street 
and broader investment communities for advice, which is important in fulfilling its 
investor protection and market integrity mandates.  For example, Bernie Madoff was 
24 See Select SEC and Market Data, Fiscal 2008, Table 2, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/ 
secstats2008.pdf. 
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a member of the SEC Advisory Committee on Market Information along with other 
leaders of investment banking firms, broker-dealers, and academics.25
While the SEC solicits the views of the firms it regulates, it also must enforce 
its rules in cases involving proceedings against firms led by the same people it looked 
to for counsel.  Separating these two functions cannot be easy, and in the case of 
Madoff, his standing at the SEC undoubtedly gave him a veneer of propriety that 
easily could have discouraged staff members from asking the kind of hard questions 
that would have led to the unraveling of his massive Ponzi scheme.26  Separating out 
at least some of the enforcement function from the regulatory process would lessen 
the likelihood that a person could turn access to the SEC into a type of “free pass” 
from close scrutiny of violations of the federal securities laws. 
When firms are accustomed to advocating to the SEC their position on how 
to craft a rule, they will not shy away from using the same pressure tactics to resist an 
enforcement action.  Moreover, they will happily recruit allies on Capitol Hill who 
have shown a proclivity for getting involved in the SEC’s operations.  When 
enforcement is but one among the many functions of an agency, it can be hard for 
its constituents to distinguish between the different roles and to understand that 
what is appropriate in one area might not be appropriate in another.  The 
enforcement operation should operate largely free from the public eye, but such 
privacy is hard to achieve when so much of the SEC’s activity is open to the public 
and subject to outside persuasion. 
25 See SEC, Report of the Advisory Committee on Market Information: A Blueprint for Responsible Change at 
n.221 (Sept. 14, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/marketinfo/ 
finalreport.htm. 
26 The SEC Inspector General’s Report reviewing the SEC’s failed inquiries into Madoff’s operation 
showed that the staff did not perform such basic functions as reviewing account and bank records to 
ascertain the scope of the investment advisory business.  OIG Madoff Report, supra note 2, at 456.  
Such simple steps would have almost immediately revealed the fraud.  The Report concluded that: 
The OIG investigation found that the SEC received numerous substantive 
complaints since 1992 that raised significant red flags concerning Madoff’s hedge 
fund operations and should have led to questions about whether Madoff was 
actually engaged in trading and should have led to a thorough examination and/or 
investigation of the possibility that Madoff was operating a Ponzi scheme.  
However, the OIG found that although the SEC conducted five examinations and 
investigations of Madoff based upon these substantive complaints, they never took 
the necessary and basic steps to determine if Madoff was misrepresenting his 
trading.  We also found that had these efforts been made with appropriate follow-
up, the SEC could have uncovered the Ponzi scheme well before Madoff 
confessed. 
Id.
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This raises a more fundamental question: is the Enforcement Division a law 
enforcement agency or a vehicle to enforce the SEC’s rules and vindicate its interests 
as an advocate?  The distinction is important because we expect a prosecutor to be 
neutral and detached, described in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct as 
a “minister of justice.”27  If the enforcement function is a means to advocate on 
behalf of the SEC, then its lawyers are like any other attorney representing a client 
and seeking the best outcome possible within the bounds of the law.  On the other 
hand, if the Enforcement Division is more of a prosecutor than an advocate, then its 
oversight should differ from that of other divisions in the SEC.  Such differentiation, 
however, does not appear to exist. 
Not only is the SEC subject to interest group lobbying, but even within the 
agency the decisions of the Enforcement Division must be approved by the same 
five Commissioners who adopt the rules being enforced.28  Unlike the Department 
of Justice, which is not responsible for enacting the criminal laws it enforces, the 
SEC both makes the rules and enforces them.  Indeed, the SEC also has the 
authority to police the attorneys who appear before it in an investigation or in 
litigation, which raises the question whether the SEC might use its disciplinary 
authority improperly.29
While the SEC is the primary civil regulatory agency responsible for 
enforcement of the federal securities laws, a violation of those provisions can also 
result in a criminal prosecution if the defendant’s violation is “willful.”30  The SEC 
27 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. [1] (2007) (“A prosecutor has the responsibility of 
a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”). 
28 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (2009) (“After investigation or otherwise the Commission may in its discretion 
take one or more of the following actions: [i]nstitution of administrative proceedings looking to the 
imposition of remedial sanctions, initiation of injunctive proceedings in the courts, and, in the case of 
a willful violation, reference of the matter to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution.”). 
29 See Julie Andersen Hill, Divide and Conquer: SEC Discipline of Litigation Attorneys, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 373 (2009). 
30 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2009), the codified version of Section 32 of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, provides: 
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter (other than section 
78dd-1 of this title), or any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of which is 
made unlawful or the observance of which is required under the terms of this 
chapter, or any person who willfully and knowingly makes, or causes to be made, 
any statement in any application, report, or document required to be filed under 
this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder or any undertaking contained in a 
registration statement as provided in subsection (d) of section 78o of this title, or 
by any self-regulatory organization in connection with an application for 
membership or participation therein or to become associated with a member 
thereof which statement was false or misleading with respect to any material fact, 
shall upon conviction be fined not more than $5,000,000, or imprisoned not more 
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and the Department of Justice frequently bring parallel civil and criminal cases, often 
filing them on the same day.31  Parallel proceedings have become a staple in 
corporate criminal cases, but it is fair to question the purpose being served by 
bringing both types of actions, especially if the SEC is acting as a prosecutor rather 
than a civil regulator. 
If the Enforcement Division should be operating like a United States 
Attorney’s Office, which seems to be the thrust of recent changes in its operations, 
then why should the civil portion be separated from the criminal?  Perhaps it would 
be better to put the civil and criminal functions in a single office, which could then 
decide whether to pursue one remedy or the other.  The creation of such a single 
office might diminish the need for a “land grab” by two competing bureaucracies, 
each seeking to vindicate its own interests or to garner its share of the spotlight.  
Such unification might also allow the SEC to avoid engaging in meaningless exercises 
of its regulatory authority, such as issuing an order barring Bernie Madoff from ever 
associating with a broker-dealer firm and disclosing the order on the same day he 
was sentenced to a 150-year prison term.32  Given Madoff’s prison sentence, is his 
future association with a broker-dealer firm a real concern? 
III. SHOULD THE SEC SPIN OFF THE ENFORCEMENT DIVISION?
Making the Enforcement Division more of a prosecutorial office raises the 
question whether prosecutorial activity is appropriate for a civil regulatory agency.  
Criminal prosecution involves considerations that are not necessarily relevant in civil 
cases, including the presumption of innocence, the need for imposing punishment, 
and the allocation of scarce prosecutorial resources.  If the goal is to bring more 
securities fraud cases, whether they involve insider trading, accounting fraud, or 
Ponzi schemes, then simply reorienting the Enforcement Division to be more 
aggressive will not ensure that result.  Instead, why not transfer the enforcement 
function for larger securities fraud cases to the Department of Justice and allow the 
than 20 years, or both, except that when such person is a person other than a 
natural person, a fine not exceeding $25,000,000 may be imposed; but no person 
shall be subject to imprisonment under this section for the violation of any rule or 
regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation. 
31 For example, on October 16, 2009, the SEC filed a civil action against a group of defendants for 
trading on inside information, the same day the Department of Justice filed a criminal complaint 
against the same defendants charging them with securities fraud based on the same trading.  See SEC 
v. Galleon Mgmt., L.P., No. 09-CV-08811 (S.D.N.Y.), complaint available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
litigation/complaints/2009/comp21255.pdf; United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09-MAG-2306 
(S.D.N.Y.), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/hedgefund/rajaratnamrajetalcomplaint.pdf. 
32 See In the Matter of Bernard L. Madoff, Admin. Proc. No. 3-13520 (SEC June 16, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2009/34-60118.pdf. 
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SEC to focus more on regulation of the capital markets and enforcement of the rules 
that pertain to those areas? 
Such a transfer of civil enforcement authority would not be the first time that 
an administrative agency has shared this function with the Department of Justice.  
Antitrust regulation is divided between the Federal Trade Commission and the 
Antitrust Division, and there is a division of authority regarding different types of 
transactions subject to review by one or the other.33  In the health care fraud area, 
the Department of Justice conducts investigations and litigation regarding Medicare 
and Medicaid fraud along with the Department of Health and Human Services.34
One obvious benefit of transferring at least some of the SEC’s civil 
enforcement function to the Department of Justice would be lessening the ability of 
Wall Street to lobby for a weaker enforcement regime.  While the SEC is in close 
touch with the constituencies it regulates, these constituencies do not have similar 
clout with the Attorney General.  Moreover, funding for the Enforcement Division 
is only one part of the larger SEC budget, which has been subject to cutbacks when 
the SEC’s regulatory efforts come under fire.  Since it is politically less palatable to 
cut the Department of Justice’s budget, funding for securities law enforcement 
would be more secure.  However, the Department of Justice is not immune to 
lobbying or political interference with its operations, a fact demonstrated by the 
regime of Attorney General Alberto Gonzales. 
If the civil and criminal enforcement operations were housed in one agency, 
there could be a greater coordination of cases.  For more serious securities law 
investigations, the grand jury could be used for its broad powers to compel the 
33 The Federal Trade Commission explains the division of authority in this way: 
Both the FTC and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division 
enforce the federal antitrust laws.  In some respects their authorities overlap, but in 
practice the two agencies complement each other.  Over the years, the agencies 
have developed expertise in particular industries or markets.  For example, the FTC 
devotes most of its resources to certain segments of the economy, including those 
where consumer spending is high: health care, pharmaceuticals, professional 
services, food, energy, and certain high-tech industries like computer technology 
and Internet services.  Before opening an investigation, the agencies consult with 
one another to avoid duplicating efforts. 
FTC, An FTC Guide to The Enforcers (July 8, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/ 
factsheets/FactSheet_FedEnforcers.pdf. 
34 See 18 U.S.C. § 3486(a) (authorizing the Attorney General to issue a civil subpoena for the 
production of documents and testimony in an investigation of any health care offense); Sliding Down 
the Slippery Slope? The Future Use of Administrative Subpoenas in Criminal Investigations, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
2251, 2265 (2005) (“In 1996, as part of HIPAA, Congress further entangled civil and criminal 
investigatory processes by granting the Attorney General the power to issue administrative subpoenas 
for use by the FBI in federal health care fraud investigations.”). 
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production of evidence and appearance of witnesses.  For more narrowly confined 
cases, civil subpoenas could be used to obtain information, particularly in cases 
involving corporations and investment firms that can be expected to be cooperative, 
at least initially.  Rather than having both criminal and civil investigators piling into a 
case, the Department of Justice could take a more measured approach and determine 
which avenue, if any, to pursue in its case.35
Any transfer of the civil enforcement function would require congressional 
authorization to permit the Department of Justice to issue civil subpoenas and 
pursue the remedies that only the SEC is currently authorized to seek.  In addition, 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) on grand jury secrecy would need to be 
modified to take into account the sharing of information gathered in a criminal 
investigation for possible use in a civil enforcement act.36  It would be useful to keep 
the authority to pursue administrative proceedings in the SEC and to limit the 
Department of Justice’s authority to only federal court actions.  The Department of 
Justice would focus on violations of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities 
laws, while the SEC would continue its role in crafting regulations and using the 
administrative process to enforce them. 
Shifting the enforcement authority over fraud cases away from the SEC 
would involve costs.  The impact on the staff morale would be significant, especially 
for those in the Enforcement Division, which would have to shrink.  Fewer 
opportunities for synergies between different divisions would exist if a significant 
portion of the enforcement function were no longer lodged in the agency, especially 
those types of contacts that occur on an informal basis among staff members who 
see one another on a regular basis.  On the other hand, removing a portion of the 
enforcement authority from the SEC could have a beneficial effect if the 
Commission were able to devote greater resources to its core regulatory function, 
while relying on another agency to carry forward the prosecutorial role. 
35 Perhaps the model used for tax investigations could be adapted to the securities field.  In tax cases, 
a revenue agent conducts a civil investigation until there are “firm indications of fraud,” at which 
point the criminal division takes over the case and the civil investigation must shut down.  See Internal 
Revenue Manual § 25.1.3.1.1 (2009); see also United States v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445, 454 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(“Continuation of audit activities after the revenue agent begins preparation of the fraud referral also 
may be indicative of an agency attempt to gather information for a criminal prosecution while keeping 
the taxpayer in the dark as to the true nature of its investigation. (citation omitted)  Indeed, the 
Manual clearly directs a revenue agent to suspend her activities at the earliest opportunity after 
developing firm indications of fraud.”).  It may be that such a division of authority could work in the 
securities area so that those being investigated have a better idea of where the government believes 
the case is headed in order to respond accordingly, rather than assuming that every case could go 
criminal and therefore being much more circumspect in any contacts with the government. 
36 Current Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 6(e) only provides that certain limited persons 
must not disclose a matter occurring before the grand jury.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B) (2009).
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IV. CONCLUSION
I am not so naïve as to think that the SEC is out there shopping its 
Enforcement Division, and am aware that any proposal to share the enforcement 
authority for securities fraud would likely draw bitter opposition from the 
Commission and its supporters, particularly those on Capitol Hill who might lose 
some of their oversight authority.  Who wants to give up authority, especially when it 
can be used to generate nice headlines in the Wall Street Journal and New York Times?
Getting a decent appraisal for the Enforcement Division or a fairness letter from an 
investment banker to support a spin-off may be more difficult. 
President Obama’s push to enhance regulation of the financial markets calls 
for rethinking not only what should be subject to greater government oversight, but 
who should be enforcing the rules.  When an agency does not fulfill its mission, as 
Chairman Mary Schapiro has candidly admitted, then it may be time to ask whether a 
more radical approach should be taken to enforce the federal securities laws.  In five 
years, will there be a push to cut back on the regulatory structure and resultant 
enforcement regime?  Moving enforcement of the antifraud provisions to the 
Department of Justice would not necessarily ensure better policing of the markets, 
but it might diminish the likelihood that there would be the oversight failures like the 
ones we have seen over the past few years. 
